Functional Safety Standards Committee

Active Standards and Current Projects

P3332 - Control-Oriented System Safety Analysis
P2851.1 - Standard for the Enablement of Functional Safety Interoperability with Reliability
Predictive Maintenance In The Context Of Functional Safety (white paper)
The Functional Safety Terminology Landscape (white paper)

Functional safety uses terminology differently in different domains, so need to create single definitions so that re-use is easier.
Need to define functional safety interoperability between domains and vertically within domains, so that results and data can easily be shared and reused, minimising mistakes and reducing efforts.
The role of software in safety-critical systems continues to increase. The rate of failure from unknown faults (defects) in software is unpredictable, thereby undermining the basis for the system safety hazard analysis methods that start from the point of a component or system failure and that rely on empirically-established failure probabilities. Besides, a system failure may have its origin in a run-time coincidence of two or more software design weaknesses, instead of in a hard, clearly delimited software fault. Altogether, control-oriented safety analysis fills a gap left by failure-oriented safety analysis methods, particularly where the systems of interest are software-intensive.

P3332 - Control-Oriented System Safety Analysis
P2851.1 - Standard for the Enablement of Functional Safety Interoperability with Reliability
Predictive Maintenance In The Context Of Functional Safety (white paper)
The Functional Safety Terminology Landscape (white paper)

Functional safety uses terminology differently in different domains, so need to create single definitions so that re-use is easier.
Need to define functional safety interoperability between domains and vertically within domains, so that results and data can easily be shared and reused, minimising mistakes and reducing efforts.
The role of software in safety-critical systems continues to increase. The rate of failure from unknown faults (defects) in software is unpredictable, thereby undermining the basis for the system safety hazard analysis methods that start from the point of a component or system failure and that rely on empirically-established failure probabilities. Besides, a system failure may have its origin in a run-time coincidence of two or more software design weaknesses, instead of in a hard, clearly delimited software fault. Altogether, control-oriented safety analysis fills a gap left by failure-oriented safety analysis methods, particularly where the systems of interest are software-intensive.